Writing_LawSociety_EpistemologiesbeyondMethods_McCann_Bateson_Latour

 

 

• Introduction

• Bateson: Beyond the Mind/Body Split (Monism or Counting Past Two?) and Doing Knowing.

• Latour, Counting Past Two.

• Influence of Feminism and Critical Legal Theory.

• Conclusion: The Post-Post Structuralism, Stuck in the Middle (Muddle) With You in Wonderland.

 

 

“A model has several uses: first, to provide a language sufficiently schematic and precise so that relations within the subject that is being modeled can be examined by comparing them with the relations within the model.” (Gregory Bateson)

 

Introduction.

An investigation into the study of politics may cover many topics and elements within a social system. However, “power” as a broad concept is often involved. Laswell ( ) referred to politics as who gets what, when, and how. Dahl (   ) measured power as difference or the inequalities over the management of resources, an access problem, leading him to ask “who governs?” Moving away from Political Science and Political Philosophy one Anthropologist (among other roles) Gregory Bateson asked, “power over what?” This presents a difficulty in the broad based examinations of “power” as a form of control, or domination. This abstraction of A over B leaves power a further abstraction that does little to describe empirically how one person is able to influence, direct, deceive, or otherwise get someone to do something that is not in their immediate, evident self-interest (Lukes, ).

 

I believe Bateson’s main critique here is not the method of study (not a disciplinary problem) but rather the use of a word “power” as borrowed from the world of energy production, physics, and distributive networks. The human individual (A) has very little power over their own life. Thus the construction I think therefore I am holds little meaning in death and obfuscates the measurement of social relations during life. In the words of Socrates, if philosophy is preparation for death, how can one view this kind of power, as a power of death, who or what holds this power, what kind of system and subsystem maintains death’s power, and what can this mean for the study of politics? Clearly the construction of A having power of B is not sufficient to answer these questions and humans have debated how best to study politics for thousands of

years.

 

This paper will follow Bateson’s ideas of epistemology to analyze power (as a sort of critical-skeptical tilt toward social science) and to present a more cohesive model to study power within political social relations and structures (institutions).

 

Harries-Jones (1996, pp.8-9) organizes a large variety of Bateson’s notes, published writings, and presentations in a single volume. He begins by explaining Bateson’s methods and his view of epistemology that does not

 

“derive merely from the head of the scientist or the work of the logician but instead ‘epistemology is that science whose subject matter is itself. It is the name of a species of scientific study and talk. We set out to study the nature of study itself, the process of acquisition and its storage (… along with the study of how epistemology is done).”

 

Bateson is particularly focused on the understanding of difference and that the differences (epistemology) are the “bridge between all branches of the world of experience – intellectual, emotional, observational, theoretical, verbal, and worldless. Knowledge, wisdom, art, religion, sport, and science are bridged from the stance of epistemology. We stand off from all these disciplines to study them and yet stand at the center of each.” (Id. at 9).

 

In Dahl’s work he thinks of politics as an arena (venue) whereby interests compete for influence over the decision-making agenda. Dahl lays out the actors in a field of social relations much like a stage of a theater and traces their moves (much like chess) as they make choices about how best to reach their intended target- this kind of power is power as influence. This matches a distributive model of power as goods and services are directed toward specific groups of people on a grid.

 

By invoking the Dahl model of power, a great amount of economic data must be used to indicate the specific weight of each set of actors, their perceived goals of influence, and to measure how well those moves influenced the decison-maker, as well as what the actual outcome was. In contrast to the Dahl model, McCann has focused more attention on the process of producing knowledge about power and how that knowledge production raises consciousness about power and influence. In this way, the field of social relations is less integrated, more disjointed, and the moves are not on a rigid chess board but are constructed more like a battle field in a military campaign. In Bateson’s study, the difference in the construction of these studies is the epistemological understanding. By contrasting Dahl’s reliance on natural venues for the competition of groups (the belief in neutrality, due process, and so on) to that of McCann (et al) we see that the venue is inherently biased toward the group who designed it, maintains it, and makes the rules for those “under the jurisdiction thereof.”

 

However, Bateson notes the “tendency towards spiritualism which seems to arise, almost inevitably, as a result of thinking about vast ecological wholes,” (Id at 14). This is an important distinction in my study which will be drawn out through the following sections. In my reduction of Dahl in contrast to McCann, I locate a transcendental belief in the target as a goal of influence. In chess, or on a theater stage, the actors are not supposed to move beyond the board, or frame of view. And yet, the actors often must exit the stage as directed, and the pieces on the chess board are actually controlled by the human off the board. While this may at first glance appear trivial, this is an important understanding within Batesonian Algebra (logic): If we are to solve for x, who devises that 7 + x = 10? The observer is always influencing the knowledge production process and is influenced by the results + process. This becomes recursive but not unlimited nor ever expanding.

 

In Dahl’s study (1966) he refers to the limits of his methods in the appendix (at 330):

 

“During three and a half centuries from Thomas Hobbes to Max Weber little was done to make widely used notions of power or influence more precise. In the last quarter century, and particularly in the last decade, the problem of providing operational meaning and measurements for the concept of power and influence has received a good deal of attention. Nonetheless, no entirely satisfactory solutions to the numerous problems involved have yet been set forth, and this book necessarily reflects the fact that concepts and methods in the analysis of influence are undergoing rapid changes. One who wishes to consider more rigorous formulations of the concept of influence used in this volume and problems of measuring differences in the influence of different individuals or actors should consult my article “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 2 (1957), pp. 201-15 and the works cited there at pp. 214-15.”

 

Dahl, also notes his work is the product of an “interchange with many scholars.” This network of both longitudinal references building and latitudinal interchange among scholars is the field of social relations that Bateson calls epistemology. The field is recursive when feedback is introduced and this recursive feedback construction/maintenance/sharing is my goal in this study henceforth. 

 

	Domination	Hegemony	Resistance	Game Theory
Power 4			McCann/Thompson	Leggett (agency)
Power 3	Bannon	Scott/PHC	Lukes	Levi/Jones
Power 2	Schmidt	Marx/Gramsci	Foucault	Chomsky
Power 1	Machiavelli	Hobbes/Waltz	Clausewitz/Dahl	Laswell

 

Dahl is not thinking about this kind of epistemology (Bateson/Leggett) but he is identifying some of the constraints to produce knowledge by a single observer and he is establishing a network of different observers. Bateson cautions against unity here and rejects “transcendent spiritualism in ecological thinking” in order to move away from the false notion of connectedness whether spiritual or scientific. (Id. at 14).  My understanding is that we should not see the field of social relations that Dahl laid out as the one to study (although many, many others have followed this route) and we should not see Dahl within a unified whole of observers. This kind of unified field would suggest the same logical fallacy in the design of the study: that a director or mover is outside of the field controlling the observer’s actions (a Weberian “calling” perhaps).

 

To avoid this category mistake (Latour) of transcendental unity Bateson focused on the presence of gaps in recursive looping in ecological systems that permit the necessary marking of distinctions and differences. I will refer to this instruction as the “difference that makes a difference.” Bateson uses two metaphors: 1) the movement of butterfly wings does not affect total process in the biosphere; and 2) he presents the planetary ecosystem as Eco, the ecological god of immanence and necessity that cannot be mocked.

 

Later in this study I will turn to Bateson’s arguments about attachment of the self to system (a hugely important gap in the ecology of power studies), microcosm to macrocosm, from Angels Fear and Sacred Unity, published after his death. But first, I want to consider this difference theorist (beyond Jung, or Reich) to:

 

“rethink scientific preconceptions about reductionism and control and to search again for the power to bind and to loose that are the building principles of life – the Riddles of the Sphinx as he once termed them,” (Id. at 14-15).

 

Bateson’s ecological understanding derives from a theory of consciousness which challenges notions of rationality established during the Enlightenment, (Id.). This argues against a notion of politics that can manage nature, resources, humans, nor the self.

 

Two different political problems have emerged on the public scene (mass media): 1) ecological crisis (as in the events that destroy human habitat and ways of living; 2) and migration as en masse, an uncontrollable movement of large scale human systems. (Here, I must try to avoid unifiying these problems; while one likely inter-relates with the other, and they both are likely to be human-made problems, there are notable differences, particularly in the way humans respond). I continue with the Bateson study to deal with the problem of generalization.

 

Much of the problem of “social theorizing” can be articulated as the bias of the observer and the artificial organization of the study. Game theory provides a useful model but also has a troubling reliance on “the importance of the institutional arrangements, that is the rules of the game that structure the choices,” (Levi, ,at 136-7).

 

McCann writes, “…without a commitment to some plausible agenda for making authoritative decisions about controlling inflation, providing decent work, securing minimum income levels, maintaining reasonable credit access, and redirecting long-term expenditure of capital at home and abroad toward basic material as well as social needs, the liberal reformers’ proclaimed desire for ‘ a revolution….in our values, outlook, and economic organization’ stands little chance of further advance.”

 

McCann later notes that “in response to increasing criticism from conservatives and to cost-benefit scrutiny of regulatory policy, some activists have increasingly show signs of willingness to develop a more affirmative economic policy orientation in their appeal to the American public (at 165).

 

Here I see the emergence of three representative players in the battlefield: P1, the use of power to dominate and control (Conservatives/Status Qou, Dahl); P2, the use of power to resist (Liberal Activists, Foucault); and P3, the general public (the field of social relations – ecology, Bateson>McCann).

 

Bateson: Beyond the Mind/Body Split (Monism or Counting Past Two?) and Doing Knowing.

 

I quote Bateson at length (Angels Fear, 1979, at 20):

 

“I think that Descartes’ first epistemological steps-the separation of “mind” from “matter” and the cogito – established bad premises, perhaps ultimately lethal premises, for Epistemology, and I believe that Jung’s statement of connection between Pleroma and Creatura is a much healthier first step. Jung’s epistemology starts from comparison of difference-not from matter….

 

…So I will define Epistemology as the science that studies the process of knowing- the interaction of the capacity to respond to the differences, on the one hand, with the material world in which those differences somehow originate, on the other. We are concerned then with an interface between Pleroma (as a name for that unliving word described by physics which in itself contains and makes no distinctions, though we must, of course, make distinctions in one description of it) and Creatura (the world of explanation in which the very phenomena to be described are among themselves governed and determined by difference, distinction, and information)…

 

…There is a more conventional definition of epistemology, which simply says that epistemology is the philosophic study of how knowledge is possible. I prefer my definition – how knowing is done– because it frames Creatura within the larger total, the presumably lifeless realm of Pleroma; and because my definition bluntly identifies Epistemology as the study of phenomena at an interface and as a branch of natural history.”

 

If I understand Bateson correctly, the algebraic x+y=z (Augustine’s 7+3=10), is less concerned about the rules (“steps and tricks we must use”) as a static statement but rather than “any” was introduced to the possibility of mathematics. In other words, that the process of constructing the formula serves as a map to better calculate the territory. In the learning environment this is often stated as learning to learn. We are here concerned with proper reasoning, does one have a strong foundational schema for determining some truth, some verity?  Bateson references Alice inquiring as to what something is named and the White Knight explaining the name is different from what it is called. The difference is the class of the item and in this sequence, x,y,z can be items in a class of algebra but cannot be in a class of x.

 

It follows to reason then that the mind is an item within the class of environment/body/matter. There is no boundary, no inside nor outside, but what the mind (thinking of the difference) names/calls the territory. The name is the “thing” the mind creates to understand the difference between items within the territory but separate from the unity of the mind/territory in the construct of the name. The process of naming is epistemological, “a human individual-every organism-has his personal habits of how he or she builds knowledge, and every cultural, religious, or scientific system promotes particular epistemological habits.”

 

I will go into greater detail below but let me introduce a problem to the study of law, politics, power, injustice/justice, and social change. Typically when I speak with others, they usually refer to law, power, politics, justice and change as something “out there”; that is to say, it appears to most people to be an object, outside of my mind, a tool, like a hammer that I can grab and use. I show the introduction to the show Heman (proper title) and stop after he grabs the sword of power to illustrate their understanding is a common one. Power/Law, of course, is not an object. However, power/law transforms from an abstract idea(l) into an instrumentality through the use of the idea, most often by a judge (decision, opinion, holding, ruling) or a lawyer (action, writ, argument). In reality, people are most often talking about abuse/limit or authority/right. The thing to be named is really what it is called but these things are a part of a class: how social groups are organized.

 

Latour: Counting Past Two 

 

Latour (Modes of Existence) provides a short-hand (heuristic) for placing law within a field of social relations (See Foucault, Power/Knowledge and compare to Lukes, Radical Power).

 

Influence of Feminism and Critical Legal Theory

 

Patricia Hill Collins has influenced my thinking throughout my ten-year study of the politics of legal exclusion. There are a few books that I return to for teaching (hooks, Teaching to Transgress; Greene, Releasing the Imagination, Ginsberg, Culturally Responsive Education) and Alice in Wonderland (Carroll) is a map for understanding difference for me. However, when it comes to the particularities that define my academic surroundings: the experiments in the academy of sciences, the vague dissidence of the humanities, and the interrogations of the causalities within the social sciences, I find Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment as a useful framework to apply my positionality as a straight, white male (WASP) and as a guide to understand the aforementioned mdoes of existences.

 

Conclusion: The Post-Post Structuralism, Stuck in the Middle (Muddle) With You in Wonderland

 

Alice asks the Cheshire Cat “which way to go” and the Cat responds, with a grin, “that entirely depends on where you want to go.” Alice confesses she does not much care and the Cheshire mirrors her response, “then it does not matter much where you begin.” This dilemma is often confronted in a number of daily experiences: what shall we eat, which movie do you want to see, what should I study, and  so on. This difficulty represents, I think, a challenge of binding what one believes to be their identity, the fact that it is always changing and one’s stubborn refusal to accept this, and what the structural roles are: how we create expectations and so on. I call this structural capacity agency. The transfer from identity to agency can be a source of much conflict. For example,